Most women receive some Social Security benefits based upon their husbands' earnings history, but husbands' benefit claiming is inconsistent with maximizing lifetime benefits for the couple. I show that husbands' claiming behavior responds to the actuarial incentives from their retired worker benefits. Not responding to incentives from spouse and survivor formulas reduces wives' lifetime benefits. Rule changes to the Social Security benefit calculation, the age difference between spouses, and the relative strength of the wife's labor force history creates variation in incentives. Segments of the population predicted to be more responsive to incentives provides similar results to the main specification.
Security Wealth, SSW), they should choose their benefit claiming age based on the total payments to be received by both spouses.
1 If husbands fail to respond to dependent (spouse or survivor) benefit incentives built into the system, they may choose a claiming age that imposes significant financial losses on their spouse. 2 Household Social Security benefits received in old age are based on multiple eligibility criteria for retired worker, spouse, and survivor benefits. The husband and wife can each receive their own retired worker benefit, and the dependent spouse, typically the wife, can receive spouse and survivor benefits if those benefits exceed her own retired worker benefits. Total lifetime benefits of households are affected by husband's claiming age because retired worker and dependent benefits both vary with the actuarial adjustments applied to monthly benefits. The incentives for claiming at any given age measure how household SSW is affected by the various actuarial adjustments.
Previous research has shown husbands' claiming behavior is, in fact, inconsistent with maximization of SSW (Munnell and Soto 2005; Sass, Sun, and Webb 2007) . Other research examining behavioral responses to Social Security incentives implicitly assumes husbands consider the incentives from his own benefit and any benefit received by his spouse equally when deciding when to claim benefits or retire (Coile and Gruber 2007; Mastrobuoni 2011) . However, it is plausible he responds differently to each type of benefit potentially due to salience of benefit structure or the timing of when benefits are paid out. 3 Financial maximization suggests that if there is a large gain (penalty) to delaying claiming, an individual is more (less) likely to delay. I show that husbands' claiming behaviors respond to the actuarial incentives built into their own retired worker benefit formula, estimating a large and significant negative response to retired worker incentives. However, I do not find a significant response to incentives from either total household benefits or the dependent benefits paid to wives. Husbands lose less than $100 in lifetime retired worker benefits when they claim at 62 instead of the age that maximizes retired worker benefits (around age 63). This is built into the system; the actuarial adjustment ensures little difference in lifetime benefits by claiming age. However, the failure to incorporate incentives from the dependent benefits reduces wives' lifetime benefits in excess of $10,000 for more than a third of wives.
Most of the variation in incentives can be explained by earnings history (Coile and Gruber 2007; Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif 2011) . This is particularly true once I separate incentives by type of benefit. Therefore, I must rely heavily on changes to the Social Security benefit formulas for exogenous variation in incentives in combination with the typical approach that relies on a control function to reduce bias from unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level. These rules impact both the normal retirement age (NRA) and the delayed retirement credit (DRC). The new laws create 11 birth cohorts in the male population, each facing a different set of rules. Changes to the NRA increase the penalty to early claiming, and increases in the DRC raise the financial gains for delaying claiming past the NRA. Variation in the birth year of each spouse creates distinct incentives for otherwise identical couples born in different years. 4 It is possible that estimates from the base model capture segments of the population more likely to consider financial incentives in decision-making or who understand the incentives better. 5 In addition, individuals who vary along health dimensions face different incentives. Individuals in poor health consider incentives in decisionmaking as they want to stop working and receive benefits as soon as possible. In fact, those with a short life expectancy maximize lifetime benefits by claiming as early as possible. In contrast, those who we observe to live longer likely have private information about their health and may be more responsive to incentives. 6 To address these concerns, I estimate the model on subsamples where measured incentives are closer to the true incentives or to those perceived by the individual. In addition, I consider a role for coordination between spouses, potentially due to joint leisure, in the claiming decision since it has proved to be an important factor in determining couples' retirement decisions (Coile 2004 ). All robustness checks provide similar results to main specification, and the final one shows a role for spousal coordination in the decision-making.
The timing of benefit receipt has typically received less attention than its labor market counterpart, retirement. Claiming spikes at 62 and 65 are larger than labor force exits (Behaghel and Blau 2013) , perhaps due to an inability to measure retirement precisely; models of claiming have more precisely measured outcomes. While most literature has focused on retirement responses, two studies have found that claiming responds more strongly to Social Security program incentives than does retirement. 7 In a simple world where claiming coincided perfectly with retirement, the claiming coefficient would be larger than the retirement coefficient since the claiming incentives are an upper-bound (that is, less negative) than the retirement incentives. Further, retirement behavior is impacted by more factors, relative to claiming, in addition to the Social Security program incentives.
The structure for the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II provides background on Social Security, Section III details the data, and Section IV provides results comparing Social Security benefits lost by couples. Section V details the empirical approach and provides estimation results and robustness checks. Section VI concludes. 4 . The rules split the wives into 13 groups based on changes to their NRAs, creating a total of 143 husbandwife birth year pairs with a unique set of rules. 5. Chan and Stevens (2008) find for private pension incentives the full sample estimate is driven solely by those who fully understand the incentives they face. 6. Incentives are calculated using population life tables using adjustments for race and education, so the true incentives are measured with error. A full treatment of this measurement error is outside the scope of this paper and is left for future work. 7. Behaghel and Blau (2013) , in addition to Coe, Khan, and Rutledge (2013) , estimate the reduced form response of changing incentives, which this study captures precisely, and find that increasing incentives to delay, claiming is delayed.
II. How Does Husband's Claiming Age
Affect His Wife's Benefits?
Since Social Security was founded in an era of one-earner families, a spouse benefit, equal to one-half of her husband's benefit, was added to the program since many wives did not have a benefit based on their own work history.
8 If eligible, 9 she is also entitled to her own retired worker benefit, with the monthly benefit, the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), a function of her lifetime earnings history subject to penalties for early claiming. In the following discussion, I refer to the ratio Wife's PIA/ Husband's PIA as the "PIA ratio," reflecting the potential retired worker benefits of each spouse. Wives expect to receive a spouse benefit if the PIA ratio is below 0.5. 10 The husband's claiming age does not impact the level of the spouse benefit directly. His claiming age only impacts her spouse benefits because she cannot claim spouse benefits until after her husband claims his retired worker benefit.
In addition to the spouse benefit, wives receive a survivor benefit equal to that received by the deceased after the primary earner dies. Survivor benefits can be claimed beginning at age 60. If the deceased claimed their own benefit early, penalties carry over to the survivor benefit. In addition, if the deceased delayed claiming past the normal retirement age, credits applied to their monthly benefit carry over to the survivor benefit. Survivor benefit calculation is the most complicated, as both the husband's and wife's claiming ages directly determine the monthly benefit. The formula for survivor benefits is:
(1) Survivor Benefit = 
The first line describes the survivor benefit amount if the husband claims early. He creates a ceiling for the maximum benefit his wife can receive. If he claims at age 62, there is a special provision so that the minimum base survivor benefit is 82.5 percent of her husband's PIA. The second and third lines detail the adjustment when he delays claiming past his NRA. His delay increases the base survivor benefit, but if she claims prior to her NRA, penalties apply.
8. Spousal benefits were not part of the original legislation that created the Social Security program in 1935 but were added in 1939 through a series of amendments to protect the worker's family. 9. Eligibility is gained by having 40 quarters of covered earnings over one's lifetime. 10. The cutoff for spouse benefits in general is 0.5 but is only relevant if she claims spouse benefits at her NRA. If she claims her own benefits before age 65, the relevant threshold decreases.
A. Calculation of Household Social Security Wealth
The first step in calculating incentives is determining the expected lifetime Social Security benefits, SSW, associated with each potential claiming age. The expected monthly payment incorporates the PIA and actuarial adjustments, including all retired worker benefits, spouse benefits, and survivor benefits the husband and wife expect to receive. All calculations assume the wife claims as soon as possible. Adding in her choice of claiming age complicates the process immensely and has little effect given that most women should claim at age 62 to maximize household SSW and that most women do claim benefits at age 62. This conclusion comes from my calculations and the results of Sass, Sun, and Webb (2007) . 11 The wife may switch to the spouse benefit when her husband claims if it is larger than her own retired worker benefit and she is currently claiming her retired worker benefit. 12 The other event that permits a change of benefit type is the death of her spouse. Once household total monthly payments are calculated, all future values are discounted to age 62 using a 3 percent annual discount rate. 13 The sex-specific mortality tables from the Social Security Administration (SSA) from 1980, 1990, and 2000 are used to estimate the probability of surviving to each future period. These survival probabilities are adjusted for differences in mortality by race and education using the adjustments from Brown, Liebman, and Pollet (2002) , following Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) .
For an individual male worker with an average life expectancy, his claiming age has little impact on his expected lifetime retired worker benefits. If he claims before or after his NRA, penalties or rewards are applied to the PIA in calculating the monthly benefit. The DRC determines the amount of reward applied to the PIA for delayed claiming and varies by birth year. Between age 62 and 64, expected retired worker benefits change little (Figure 1 ).
14 After the NRA, lifetime benefits decline due to a less than actuarially fair DRC. For new and future beneficiaries, the profile after age 65 is much flatter.
In contrast to lifetime retired worker benefits, household SSW can be impacted a great deal more by his choice of claiming age. The impact of husband's claiming age on household SSW is shown in Figure 2 for two hypothetical couples where the wives are both three years younger than their husbands.
15
In the first couple, the wife is not eligible for her own benefits, recreating the presentation from Coile et al. (2002) . For this couple, household benefits contain the husband's retired worker benefits, spouse benefits, and survivor benefits. Since spouse benefits are not paid until her husband claims his own benefits, there is a decline in spouse benefits after he reaches age 65 while she waits for him to claim. After age 62 and 2 months, survivor benefits increase monotonically as the husband's claiming age increases. When claiming is delayed past age 65, the declining lifetime spouse and his worker benefits outweighs the increase in her lifetime survivor benefits, resulting in a decline in total expected household benefits.
11. Less than 10 percent of women have a PIA ratio greater than her husband. All women with a PIA ratio less than 1 should claim at 62 to maximize their own benefits (author's calculation). 12. These are the same assumptions used by Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) . 13. Those in the literature using 3 percent include Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009); Mastrobuoni (2011); and Coile et al. (2002) . Any increase in the discount rate increases incentives to claim at age 62. 14. For exposition, Figure 1 Notes: For males with PIA of $963 born in 1937; NRA = 65 and DRC = 6.5 percent; wife three years younger. PIA ratio = Wife PIA/Husband PIA. If PIA ratio = 0, the household benefits are husband's retired worker, spouse and survivor benefits. If PIA ratio = 0.7, the household benefits are husband's retired worker, wife's retired worker, and survivor benefits.
The second couple has a PIA ratio high enough to make the spouse benefit irrelevant (PIA ratio = 0.7). Thus, their household benefits include both his and her retired worker benefits and her survivor benefits. The primary difference from the first couple for this example, besides the level differences, will be the lack of spouse benefits after age 65 impacting the trajectory of SSW. For this couple, SSW rises between ages 62 and 65, while survivor benefits increase faster than his worker benefits fall. 16 However, the reverse is true after age 65 due to the less than actuarially fair DRC. 17 Household SSW is also maximized at age 65 for this couple. 18 The pattern of SSW over husband's claim age does not differ much between the two couples because the total of spouse benefits and retired worker benefits of the spouse do not change substantially with husband's claiming age.
While the total SSW difference between husband's claiming at 62 and 65 may not seem substantial in this simple example, there is substantial heterogeneity in the population of the effect of husband's claiming age on total household expected benefits.
19 Detailed discussion is found in Section IV. In addition, as the Social Security benefit rules have changed, the difference between SSW at 62 and 65 has increased due to changes in the normal retirement age, and the decline between ages 65 and 68 has flattened due to the increase in the delayed retirement benefits. As a result, for younger couples, the slope of SSW between age 62 and the full retirement age is steeper, and the increased delayed retirement credit flattens the trajectory after the full retirement age. (See Appendix Figures  A1-A3 for the impact of benefit changes on both retired worker and survivor benefits.)
B. Women and Social Security
There has been a large increase in the labor force participation (LFP) of women and a narrowing of the gender wage gap. With these changes, women are more independent of their husbands in determining their economic well-being while of working age. Increased market wages and narrowing of the gender gap increase bargaining power in household financial decision-making (Pollak 2005; Knowles 2007 ). We might expect women to be more self-sufficient when they reach old age as a result of these drastic changes. Due to Social Security rules, however, wives remain dependent on husbands in old age (Levine, Mitchell, and Phillips 2000) . Even while women have increased their LFP and received higher wages, a husband typically works more years than his wife, between maternity leave and child rearing, and receives higher wages. As a result, most women end up relying on spouse and survivor benefits from Social Security.
Over the past 50 years, the fraction of women eligible for their own benefit increased by almost 100 percent. In 1940, less than half of female recipients of Social Security were eligible for their own retired worker benefit, with eligibility defined by having at 16 . To see how each how worker and survivor benefits change with the husband's claim age for this example, see Appendix Figures A1 and A2. 17. Table 1 in Sass and Sun (2009) show ages that maximize the Household SSW are closer to 70 than to 65. Their focus is on men born in 1948. These men have a normal retirement age of 66 and a delayed retirement credit of 8 percent. Both of these parameters contribute to a financially maximizing claiming age past the normal retirement age. 18. Husbands with wives that expect to receive retired worker benefits in addition to spouse benefits maximize SSW at an age between ages 65 and 68. This age varies with the PIA ratio. 19. The median difference between ages 62 and 65 is approximately $8,400 in the sample, with the 25th percentile around $5,000 and the 75th percentile around $13,000. least 40 quarters of covered earnings. Almost three-quarters of current female beneficiaries are eligible to receive a benefit based on their own work history. However, the fraction of women receiving some type of dependent benefits has been well over 50 percent for the past several decades. 20 Only since the mid-1990s has this fraction begun to fall (Social Security Administration, various years). Furthermore, more than 90 percent of recent female recipients are entitled to a retired worker benefit smaller than their potential survivor benefit, making eligibility for wives' own benefits less relevant. 21 In all of these cases, wives are impacted by husbands' choices. Data from SSA on dual beneficiaries, those eligible for both their own worker benefit and a spouse or survivor benefit, show how this dependence has changed over time. For wives receiving spouse benefits, the ratio of own benefit to spouse benefit increases from 1995 to the present. This is expected since women have been earning more in the labor market and working more years over their lifetimes.
This ratio has been flat recently, though, for survivor benefits. This suggests that women are just as reliant on survivor benefits as in previous years. The likely explanation for the difference in trend between spousal dual beneficiaries and survivor dual beneficiaries is that the latter group is older than the former. The labor force characteristics of survivor beneficiaries has not changed substantially over recent years. However, we expect a rise in the ratio in the future as women with stronger worker histories (those currently receiving spousal benefits) receive survivor benefits.
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III. Data
The data utilized in this study, referred to as the Synthetic SIPP, are an administrative dataset that merges (i) a pared down version of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data from the 1990s and 2000s (1990-1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004) , (ii) Summary Earnings Records (SER) and Detailed Earnings Records (DER) from the Internal Revenue Service, and (iii) the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) from SSA. 23 These data are nearly ideal for the current study. Included in the data are birth date, OASDI claiming date and type of initial benefit, marital history, death date, earnings history, and a link to current spouse. Importantly, it is possible to determine whether individuals were married at the time of claiming using the marital history module from the SIPP. Marital status at potential claiming ages is crucial information in determining incentives faced by men. It is also necessary to remove those 20. Mostly these are women receiving survivor benefits. Only 20% of current female beneficiaries receive spouse benefits. 21. Author's calculation. 22. Another factor that would impact these facts is any changes in the correlation between mortality of the husband and wife might cause different patterns for spouse and survivor benefits if the trends are different for high-and low-wage women. 23. This project is housed at the Census Bureau. An application for the publicly available data can be found at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/guidance/sipp-synthetic-beta-data-product.html. Questions can be directed to sehsd.synthetic.data.use.list@census.gov. Missing values are imputed to the final data due to an incomplete merge between administrative and survey data. Four imputations are performed, and final estimates average the four sets of results and calculate standard errors to account for the imputation uncertainty. Details on this process are specified in Abowd, Stinson, and Benedetto (2006) . who received disability benefits (DI) prior to age 62 since they do not face a claiming decision at age 62 due to automatic enrollment into the old age program. The sample used for analysis includes all males born between 1930 and 1945. Earnings histories for those born before 1930 are not complete, as the earnings data begin in 1951. The last year we observe claiming is 2007. Those born in 1945 reach age 62 in 2007, allowing their inclusion since we observe their decision at age 62.
The sample contains more than 20,000 men who received retired worker benefits as their initial benefits from OASDI.
24 Table 1 contains summary statistics for the analytical sample. At age 62, men have no financial incentive from their own benefits to delay claiming benefits. 25 Approximately 90 percent of households containing a married couple expect to receive survivor benefits, and nearly half expect to receive spouse benefits. More than 90 percent were married (at age 62), and almost one-half of men exit the labor force before age 62. On average, wives are 2.3 years younger than their husbands.
26 Due to the earnings histories available, couples are only included when wives are born between 1930 and 1950. 24. The empirical analysis includes unmarried men as a control group in the base model. This may seem puzzling given the underlying motivation of the interaction between husbands' behavior and impacts on wives' outcomes. However, if husbands only consider their own benefits and not spouse or survivor benefits when choosing claiming age, there should be no difference in behavior between married and unmarried men. 25. All values are taken at age 62. 26. I trim outliers that look like data errors, those who have wives more than 40 years older (ten observations) or those who have PIA ratios above 50 (five observations).
Nearly one-half of men claim benefits as soon as they are eligible ( Figure 3 ).
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There is a second spike at age 65, with very few individuals claiming after this age. Onequarter of men claim between their 63rd and 65th birthdays, while less than 10 percent claim after they turn 65. Those not married are equally likely to claim before age 62.5 as married men, but married men are 10 percent more likely to claim around age 65. This latter fact, but not the former, is consistent with the predictions from financial maximization seen in the previous section but weak evidence at best. The key question underlying this analysis is whether the presence of wives' benefits causes different behavior among men. If singles claim in similar patterns to married men, the presence of dependent benefits likely plays no role in the claiming decision. Financial maximization predicts that married men should claim later than unmarried men, but Coile et al. (2002) find this does not hold in the cross-section. The empirical distributions in Figure 3 cannot confirm this result. This study answers whether differences in claiming by marital status are due to the presence of dependent benefits.
Figure 3 Empirical Distribution of Claiming Age by Marital Status at Claiming, Males
27. Since the youngest cohorts have not reached full retirement age, this figure only contains those who reach at least age 66 in the data. Including the younger cohorts would overweight early claiming. That said, when all cohorts are included, the fraction claiming before age 63 only increases from 59 to 61 percent. 28. Due to a technical rule, most individuals are not eligible until they are 62 years and one month old.
IV. Benefits Lost Due to Actual Claiming Age
We saw in the previous section that a substantial fraction of husbands claim benefits at age 62. Given the simple example from Figure 2 , this suggests husbands' choices may be leaving money on the table that could have been received by their households. It is important to understand the costs of these choices. To do this, I compare the household's maximum potential benefits to the expected benefits to be paid as a result from claiming choices (call this value "benefits lost"). The Synthetic SIPP contains more than 20,000 matched couples and furthermore includes both spouses' earnings histories, which are the crucial component to calculating the PIA ratio. Most datasets do not include full earnings histories for both spouses, and those that do, such as the matched HRS, are significantly smaller.
29 Almost one-half of husbands should claim at age 65 to maximize household SSW, assuming wives claim as soon as possible (Figure 4 ), while more than one-third should claim after age 65. 30 Recall from Figure 2 that men maximize their own benefits between ages 62 and 63. The concentration at age 65 is primarily due to the less than fair delayed retirement credit (DRC) for the older cohorts. The DRC has increased recently, beginning with those born in 1925, but does not reach a more actuarially fair level until the 1939 cohort. For cohorts with the most favorable DRC, there is less mass where the NRA maximizes household SSW. Other than cohort variation in the rules, the PIA ratio and age difference between spouses provide the remaining variation to determine the SSW maximizing claiming age.
Looking back at Figure 3 , the empirical claiming distribution, there is a lot of concentration at age 62 and little near age 65. If married men maximized household SSW, there would be a large mass at age 65. In addition, less than 10 percent of husbands "should" claim before age 63, far less than the observed 50 percent seen in Figure 3 . Since behavior appears inconsistent with maximizing household SSW, I document the costs associated with actual claiming behavior. To do this, I look at how much money is left on the table as a result of early claiming. 31 Sass, Sun, and Webb (2007) explore this question for the HRS and find expected survivor benefits are the most affected. The Synthetic SIPP allows a larger number of birth cohorts to be analyzed. I first look at how much household wealth is "lost" due to early claiming by comparing the maximum available SSW and benefits received as a result of actual behavior.
32 About two-thirds of couples lose a total of at least $10,000, and about one-third lose at least $25,000 ( Figure  5 ). The numbers do not allow us to directly answer two questions. First, "Who bears the burden?" Second, "What does this mean in terms of monthly benefits?" To answer the first question, I group the benefits in the following way: (i) husband's retired worker 29. Sass, Sun, and Webb (2007) calculate SSW maximizing delay for husbands and wives, but they calculate a PIA ratio for only 187 couples. Given the need to observe married men at claiming ages and that both spouses need to have given consent to match their data, they only have a sample of approximately 1,400 married men of the full nearly 8,000 individuals who consented to be matched with data, but not all of these had spouses with matched data. Their study requires labor force exit prior to age 62, which reduced the sample substantially (by 70%). 30. These values are taken at annual intervals due to the Census Bureau's procedures to minimize disclosure risk. 31. In a slight abuse of terminology, I use the term "claim early" to refer to behavior not maximizing SSW. 32. Potential benefits are calculated using three-month intervals instead of the annual intervals reported in Distribution of Claiming Age that Maximizes Household SSW benefits, (ii) spouse benefits and wife's retired worker benefits received while husband is alive, and (iii) survivor benefits and wife's retired worker benefits received after the husband dies.
33 I refer to benefits paid to the wife while her husband is alive as "wife benefits" and benefits expected to be paid to the wife after her husband dies as "survivor benefits."
Almost half of husbands gain expected worker benefits due to choice of claiming age when compared to the benefits he would expect to receive if he maximized household SSW ( Figure 6 ). These extra worker benefits are not large, with less than 10 percent gaining more than $10,000 in expected lifetime worker benefits. One potential simple explanation for the mass at 62 seems to be the majority of husbands respond only to their own benefit incentives. Since the SSW maximizing delay for most husbands is around age 65 to maximize household benefits and between ages 62 and 63 to maximize own benefits, husbands gain slightly from their choice of claiming age.
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Figure 6
Lifetime OASI Benefits Lost, by Type. Maximum OASI Benefits Less Actual Expected Benefits Note: Maximum benefits are defined by the claiming age that maximizes the sum of wife and husband's worker benefits, spouse, and survivor benefits.
33. Both spouse and survivor benefits are substitutes for the wife's retired worker benefits. Consider couples where the wife's PIA is approximately half of her husband's. If it is slightly less (greater) than half, she will (will not) receive the spouse benefit once eligible. In both cases, the total amount of benefits paid to the household will be the same. These couples are nearly identical in terms of SSW. The same logic holds for survivor benefits. 34. It is important to keep in mind that these values are for average life expectancy. If an individual believes he will die sooner than average, he should claim benefits earlier and will attain greater lifetime benefits than if he delayed.
Wives must bear the majority of costs associated with early claiming since claiming age affects husbands' retired worker benefits little. The distributions for lost wife and survivor benefits only include couples expected to receive each type of benefit given their PIA ratio. Over 40 percent of wives lose more than $10,000 in expected lifetime survivor benefits, while almost 10 percent lose more than $40,000. The large losses in survivor benefits are driven by the youngest cohorts, who have higher AIMEs and, more importantly, later NRAs and higher DRCs, which lead to larger survivor benefits losses.
It is difficult to conceptualize how big these wealth losses are in a practical sense because they incorporate survival probabilities. Although there may be a small impact on expected lifetime survivor benefits when the husband is 62, there could be larger impacts for his wife down the road, particularly if there is a large age difference between spouses' ages. To address this, I compare the monthly survivor benefits received under actual husband behavior and hypothetical behavior. This also indicates the potential impact on economic well-being of surviving widows. The three scenarios presented in Figure 7 are: (i) actual claiming behavior, (ii) the age which maximizes household SSW, and (iii) age 68. Given actual claiming choices and assuming the husband passes away after his wife turns 65, more than 20 percent of widows would find themselves living below the poverty line if she had no other
Figure 7
Actual and Potential Survivor Benefits income. 35 In contrast, if husbands claimed at the age that maximized household benefits, 15 percent would be below the poverty line. If he claimed at age 68, later than the age that typically maximizes household SSW, 10 percent would be in poverty. Not all widows rely solely on Social Security for their income, but for many, Social Security plays a large role, particularly at the lower end of the income distribution. In 2008, almost half of unmarried female beneficiaries, including widows, received more than 90 percent of their income from Social Security (Social Security Administration 2010).
V. Analysis
The empirical approach estimates a reduced form model of claiming. Panis et al. (2002) and Behaghel and Blau (2012) , among others, use a reduced form approach to modeling for claiming behavior, and many others have estimated reduced form equations of retirement. Coile and Gruber (2007) estimate a probit model using Social Security benefits and financial incentives as their key independent variables, adapting the option value measure from Stock and Wise (1990) into financial terms.
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Given the link between claiming and retirement (Coile et al. 2002) , it is natural to apply an analogous approach to Social Security claiming. The empirical models regresses an indicator for claiming benefits at age a on Social Security incentives at age a and control variables using a linear probability model:
The control variables that change over time are the incentives from Social Security, age, and year. Individuals are removed from the sample after they claim benefits, so this model estimates hazard rates. The age controls are dummy variables for each age in the sample omitting age 62. This allows for the value of leisure to change over time in a nonlinear fashion while accounting for traditional focal points associated with claiming at age 62 or 65. 38 It should also help address sample selection issues that may arise if those in the sample for longer are different in unobservable dimensions from those who claim at age 62.
The following discussion describes the financial incentives used as controls throughout the analysis. Social Security benefits and the corresponding incentives are a direct function of the PIA. Two channels impact the PIA when claiming is delayed. One is due to the change in PIA due to continued work, where a high earnings year can replace a low earnings year. 39 The other is due to the actuarial adjustment of benefits. Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) use the former source for identification since they focus on the 35. Annual threshold for the aged determined by the Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html (accessed June 29, 2017). 36. Warner (1978) used a concept called Cost of Leaving (COL), which is analogous to the PV measure. 37. Estimates from a logit model are consistent with the reported results. 38. Behaghel and Blau (2012) and Coe, Khan, and Rutledge (2013) directly evaluate the impact of focal points at the NRA and age 65 using indicator variables to estimate the impact of these focal points on claiming behavior. 39. If next year's earnings are expected to be greater than the lowest earnings year included in AIME, the top 35 annual earnings, then the PIA is expected to increase. Sabelhaus (2007) shows that continued work has little impact on incentives for men just prior to retirement, with the median effective marginal tax rate flat between ages 62 and 64. If the PIA were to be rising as work continued, the effective tax rate would labor supply incentives for retirement. Since claiming is the outcome of interest, it is important to use the financial incentives corresponding only to claiming, not to labor force exit. Most studies combine the two channels, but it is important use the appropriate incentives for each decision. Therefore, this study holds PIA fixed while changing the actuarial adjustment, focusing only on the incentives caused by a change in the claiming age, not continued work. Separating the response to each channel, driven by different parameters of the Social Security program, is also informative for reform.
Incentives measure the financial gain from delaying claiming from period t to a future period. By delaying today, one retains the option to claim benefits at a later date. Two measures of financial incentives, peak value (PV) and accrual (ACC), are typically used in studies of claiming and retirement. The ACC compares SSW in t to SSW in t + 1, whereas the PV compares SSW t to the value at its maximum (SSW max ). Almost every study calculates total household SSW defined as benefits paid from both the husbands' and wives' earning histories and uses the resulting incentives as the key independent variable.
40 One drawback to financial measures is that they do not account for the disutility of work, an important feature when considering retirement incentives, but less of an issue in this analysis focusing on benefit claiming.
Focusing on household incentives implicitly assumes husbands take all household benefits into consideration when making their claiming (or retirement) decisions. This approach assumes the husband is indifferent between types of benefits received by the household over all points in time, regardless of whether he is alive when the benefits are received and regardless of who receives the benefits. This assumption needs to be formally evaluated. Much variation in household benefits, particularly between the early and full retirement ages, is in terms of the survivor benefit. (Recall from Section II that claiming age impacts a husband's retired worker benefits little, and for most couples does not have a large impact on total benefits received by the spouse while he is alive.) 41 Husbands may not weight these benefits as heavily as benefits received while alive, or the husband may know less about them for this reason, and this possibility causes difficulty in interpreting results that estimate the behavioral response to overall household incentives. 42 After noting this, a natural extension to previous studies is to consider each benefit separately. Incentive measures can easily be defined for each type of benefit after separating SSW into its components. The key contribution of this study is measuring incentives and the behavioral responses to these measures in a piecewise approach. It is possible husbands are more sensitive to their own benefits, or at least more sensitive to benefits received while they are alive. Estimates for the response to household incentives are compared to results allowing for separate benefit incentives to see which model is more consistent with observed behavior. If behavior is consistent with treating all benefits equally, the coefficients on each type of benefit will be equal. This value would also be equal to the coefficient on the household incentives in a separate decline. Therefore, not using this dimension for variation in Social Security incentives would introduce very little measurement error. 40. The exception is Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) , who calculate incentives from benefits paid out on the husband's and wife's work histories separately. 41. For additional details, see Appendix Figures A1-A3 to see how worker and survivor benefits vary with husband's claiming age. For wife benefits, less than 30% of married couples expect his claiming age to impact her total spouse and retired worker benefits (Table 1) . 42. Alternatively, the weight placed on the survivor benefits can be likened to a bequest one leaves his wife.
model. This desired comparison provides additional incentive to focus on the accrual measure in addition to the linearity mentioned earlier.
The available incentive measures must be evaluated to find the best fit for the new approach to measuring the response to incentives. It is straightforward to compare accrual measures both across individuals and for all types of benefits. When comparing two individuals, ACC calculates the annual change in SSW for each-how this year's decision is impacted by this year's incentive. Since the PV measure does not capture the timing of when the maximum value occurs for two individuals, using the PV measure complicates the interpretation of the impact of benefit-specific incentives. Further, at ages close to claiming, there will be less difference between the two measures (where retirement models will see significant differences at ages further from claiming).
There could be three different ages that correspond to maximizing each type of benefit (worker, wife, and survivor) for a given individual. The age that maximizes worker benefits is between age 62 and 63, and the survivor benefit maximizes around age 70. The age at which wife benefits maximize varies with the age difference between spouses and the PIA ratio. SSW is the sum of husband's worker benefits, wife's benefits, and survivor benefits, but this linearity will not hold for the PV measure. The PV of household will not equal the sum of the individual benefit PVs. However, the linearity will hold for the accrual measure.
(3) ACC SSW = ACC worker + ACC wife + ACC surv While looking for suitable variation to identify the response to Social Security incentives, studies have focused on the significant heterogeneity in household incentives. Variation in incentives comes from earnings histories of each spouse and the interaction of the couple's PIA ratio and age difference. Much of this heterogeneity is driven by eligibility for different types of benefits: worker, spouse, or survivor. This interaction creates nonlinearities in lifetime benefits around thresholds associated with "eligibility" for spouse and survivor benefits (Figure 8) . 43 This is the variation in incentives used for identification used by most studies of claiming and retirement. It is easy to see how the variation in total incentives can be attributed to the spouse and survivor incentives. This provides additional motivation to use incentives associated with each separate benefit. Remaining cross-sectional variation comes from earnings differences, age difference between spouses, and changes in mortality between cohorts.
Omitted variables bias is less of a concern in a model of claiming than in a model of retirement unless claiming is a one-to-one mapping of retirement. In a model of retirement, the primary factors that determine incentives, measures of earnings history, play a direct role in the retirement decision. The claiming incentives are a function of program rules only and therefore are outside of the control of the individual. Additionally, since all individuals in the sample are a minimum of 62 years old, there is less uncertainty in incentives. 44 This leads to less noise in the measurement of incentives. Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2004) find that when there is more uncertainty, individuals are less likely to know their Social Security benefit.
43. Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) are able to rely on discontinuities because they focus on the tax-benefit link and separate benefits paid on the wife's work history separately from those paid on the husband's. 44. Most studies of retirement consider samples of individuals who are at least 50 or 55 years old. This adds 7-12 years of uncertain outcomes the individual has to account for.
Following previous research, I use a control function approach that includes all variables used to calculate incentives. This ensures estimates are not driven by variation correlated with individual heterogeneity that determines labor force choices over the life cycle. Coile and Gruber (2007) acknowledge the determinants of SSW are likely correlated with the retirement decision. 45 Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) are more explicit in describing the benefit formulas that drive model identification and how they use this information in defining their control function. The control function includes the same interactions of average lifetime earnings and potential earnings included in Coile and Gruber (2007) . Following Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) , measures of lagged earnings of the worker and his spouse back to age 30 and quartics of ln(SSW) are also included. Since the empirical analysis considers each type of benefit separately, quartics of ln(worker benefits), ln(wife benefits), and ln(survivor benefits) are controlled for. 46 This control function captures approximately 75 percent of the variation in accrual for worker benefits likely biasing against finding any response to these incentives, but captures only about one-third of the variation in the wife and survivor incentives. With the control function approach, the effect of differences in incentives within cohort are driven by the nonlinearities in the benefit calculation, which transform earnings into 45. Their control function contains quartics in AIME and potential earnings of both the individual and their spouse, the primary determinants of incentives. 46. I cannot duplicate the full control function used in their study due to data differences but capture the primary components and use more flexible controls for expected benefits. The HRS, used by Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) , contains more measures of labor force behavior like tenure and detailed occupation and industry. monthly benefit (for example, the 35-year earnings rule and progressive piecewise benefit calculation; see Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif [2009] for a thorough discussion).
The other source of identification is due to parametric changes in the Social Security benefit formulas. This source of identification has been use previously by Song and Manchester (2007) , Kopczuk and Song (2008) , Mastrobuoni (2009), and Behaghel and Blau (2012) , among others. There are two different types of changes. The first is an increase in the normal retirement age. It gradually increases from age 65 to 67 beginning with the cohort born in 1938. The second change is an increase in the delayed retirement credit from 3 percent per year to 8 percent per year beginning with those born in 1925 and ending with those born in 1960. Both of these changes increase the return to delaying retirement but at different points in the claiming distribution. 47 Most studies that rely on this variation for identification are strictly reduced form as the data analyzed do not allow the full calculation of household incentives due to incomplete spouse or earnings information. This study does not face this shortcoming. The benefit rule changes allow differences in incentives across cohorts to be identified off of different incentives for equivalent individuals.
To illustrate the impact of rule changes on benefits and incentives, consider a husband born in 1937 who claims his benefits at the EEA. He receives 80 percent of his PIA as a monthly benefit. 48 An individual born in 1938 receives 79.17 percent if he claims at age 62 and 0 months, and someone born in 1939 receives 78.33 percent. It is akin to multiple natural experiments. As the NRA increases, the incentives to claim at age 62 fall.
49 If benefits are claimed at age 62 when an individual's NRA is 66, 75 percent of the PIA is paid as a monthly benefit. For these two NRAs of 65 and 66, the ACC at age 62 is -$74 and -$1,765, respectively.
Changes to the DRC imply the incentives at the NRA are larger for younger individuals. An individual born in 1924 would receive 103 percent of his PIA as a monthly payment of his retired worker benefit if claimed at age 66, but someone born in 1935 would receive 106 percent of his PIA if benefits are claimed at age 66. This makes the incentives to delay at age 65 twice as large for the younger individual. Changes in the DRC also impact incentives for survivor benefits beginning at the NRA in a similar manner, but the calculation is more involved.
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Identification of the response to spouse and survivor accruals comes from changes to the wife's NRA since the rules discussed above apply to all beneficiaries. The actuarial adjustment for each benefit is a function of the wife's birth year. The wide range of birth years of women married to men born between 1930 and 1945 create variation in the exact level of benefits. 51 Further, the age difference between spouses varies the importance of spouse and survivor benefits for each couple. The SSWof those with younger wives has a larger weight on survivor benefits, while those with older wives have a relatively larger weight on the spouse benefit, holding the PIA ratio constant.
47. There are cohort trends in early claiming where those born between 1930 and 1934 claim earlier than those born between 1935 and 1939 (Haaga and Johnson 2012 . However, this goes the opposite direction of what we would expect in response to the rule changes to the DRC. We do observe that cohorts affected by increased NRA do claim later, consistent with the financial incentives (Mastrobuoni 2009) . 48. This is true only for those who are born on the 2nd of the month. For everyone else, their EEA is 62 and one month, so they receive 80.55% of their PIA as a monthly benefit if they claim at their EEA. 49. Appendix Figure A1 considers the increase in NRA from 65 to 66. 50. The impact of DRC on expected survivor benefits can be found in Appendix Figure A2 . 51. See Appendix Figure A3 for impact on expected survivor benefits.
Although claiming choice is a financial decision, in practice, factors other than Social Security incentives impact claiming. Credit constraints and preferences for leisure are two factors that likely influence claiming age independently of Social Security incentives. In addition, mortality expectations impact claiming through the impact on expected future benefits (Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos 2004; Delavande, Perry, and Willis 2006) . Control variables included to proxy for these additional inputs in decision-making are education, marital status, work-limiting disability, experience and its square, household wealth including square and cubic, and observed mortality.
This study requires assumptions be made about retirement behavior to isolate the Social Security claiming decision. One approach used previously focuses only on those who have left the labor force before age 62, since these individuals are able to fund retirement prior to receipt of Social Security benefit. Therefore, at age 62, the claiming decision is primarily a financial one (Sass, Sun, and Webb 2007) . However, this removes a large fraction of the Social Security beneficiaries. To proceed, I assume claiming is independent of the retirement decision. If claiming is a response to or part of exiting the labor force, there should be a weak independent response of claiming to Social Security incentives. Since incentives used only account for the actuarial adjustment and not the incentives associated with labor supply, bias due to this source is less of a concern. The choice to hold PIA fixed at age 62, which isolates the role of actuarial adjustments, understates the gain associated with claiming delay.
A. Results
Results using both PV and ACC are reported for the base model, but the remaining analysis is estimated with the ACC measure only (see previous discussion). Table 2 begins with results for the response to household incentives in Column 1 to highlight what the approach used in the literature lacks and allow comparison to previous work. Claiming responds very slightly to the household incentives. The coefficient on the ACC measure in Column 1 suggests a $1,000 increase in the annual change in household SSW leads to no change in the probability of claiming.
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For some individuals, single men, for the most part, household incentives are defined only by retired worker benefits. For others, the incentives are a combination of worker, spouse, and survivor benefits. Recognizing this fact makes it more difficult to interpret the estimated response to household incentives. As such, the remaining models separate out incentives by type of benefit. There is a strong negative response to the incentives from the retired worker benefit (Table 2) . In Column 2, a $1,000 increase in worker incentives reduces the hazard rate by 1.6 percentage points in the ACC model and 2.4 percentage points in the PV model. 53 These results suggest a stronger response to the 52. There is no response to benefit incentives for early retirees (results available upon request), consistent with the findings of Mastrobuoni (2011) . Since early retirees only face incentives due to the actuarial adjustment and no changes to PIA, the incentives used here are identical to those used in the Mastrobuoni (2007) early retiree model. This is expected as both samples are drawn from the SIPP, with only slight differences in sample selection. 53. As noted, we must assume claiming independent of retirement decision. It is given that this is a strong assumption generally, but for the current context, we would be primarily concerned if it were the case that retirement decision was responding to the claiming incentives and claiming was merely acting as a retirement proxy. In an analysis not shown (available upon request), under a number of retirement definitions and sample total gain in potential benefits than the annual gain, but not statistically different. Since there is little difference between the ACC and PV measures for retired worker benefits, we should not read too much into this difference. 54 There is no response to the incentives from either wife or survivor benefits. The lack of effect for wife benefits may be due to Source: Averaged values from four completed data implicates from Gold Standard data. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and calculated as detailed in Abowd et al. (2006) to combine the four estimates of variance. Notes: Population mortality tables used in calculation of incentives. Control variables in each model are age dummies, education, interactions of quartics of AIME and potential earnings, own and spouse earnings starting at age 30, experience and its square, death after age 75 of self and spouse, death after age 80 of self and spouse, years since retirement (if retired), presence of work-limiting disability, presence of DB/DC pension, net household wealth up to its cubic, and log(SSW), log(worker benefits), log(spouse benefits), and log (survivor benefits) up to their cubics. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.5, ***p < 0.01.
age restrictions, labor force exit is not responding to claiming incentives. At most, the response of retirement to claiming incentives is 10 percent of the value reported for claiming. 54. For most, the maximum for retired worker benefits occurs between ages 62 and 63. For some workers, ACC and PV may differ at age 62, but not afterwards.
the fact that for a large majority of wives, husband's claiming age has no impact on her lifetime expected wife benefits ( Figure 6) . 55, 56 Model 3 combines the household and worker incentives in one model to see which measure is more important in determining claiming behavior of men. These results are consistent with the preceding models. Claiming responds strongly to the worker incentives but not to any other incentives, including those defined by household benefits. This is the primary message to be taken from this study. It is important to allow for the response to vary by type of benefits, as controlling for the overall incentives hides the true behavioral response.
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B. Robustness Checks
Before concluding husbands do not consider their spouses' benefit incentives when making their claiming choice, there are a few robustness checks to explore. The first approach is to identify groups in the population where there is more variation in claiming behavior. This ensures the model is not solely capturing individuals claiming at 62 due to a default rule who also happen to face incentives which encourage them to claim early. This also may identify populations who are more likely to respond to the other benefit incentives. 58 The second goal is to identify populations who either understand the incentives better or may be more likely to respond to the incentives they face. This focuses on groups where the perceived incentives are closer to the calculated incentives, reducing bias from measurement error.
The first robustness check incorporates the impact of health status on Social Security incentives as expected lifetime plays a central role in the calculation of SSW. Since those who do not live as long receive benefits over fewer years, claiming benefits early maximizes the lifetime benefits for those with worse mortality prospects. Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2004) and Delavande, Perrry, and Willis (2006) find those with high mortality expectations claim benefits slightly earlier than those who think they have a good chance of living to age 75. There are no measures of mortality expectations in the SIPP, so I cannot allow the response to incentives to vary by mortality expectations. Instead, ex post mortality is used as a proxy instead, since it is likely to be correlated with private information that informs mortality expectations. Those with short life expectancies or low mortality expectations should claim as soon as possible to maximize SSW and should be less likely to respond to the calculated financial incentives. The first approach interacts the response to incentives with a dummy variable for whether the individual 55. Single men are included as a control sample in these models. Once incentives are split by type, single men only have nonzero incentives in the household or worker columns. If this control group is removed, the results remain the same. 56. I also estimate a model where I collapse the wife and survivor benefits into one control variable, "dependent benefits," to see if a lack of variation is causing little statistical power. This is not the case because dependent benefits combined are also not statistically significant. The control function does not create lack of variation, and only in the case of wife benefits is there a concern for little variation in the right-hand-side variable. 57. As robustness checks, I estimate (i) the model only at age 62 to look at the impact of incentives on early claiming and (ii) a model comparing the choice to claim at age 62 compared to claiming at 65. Results from these analyses find qualitatively similar results and are available upon request. 58. Behaghel and Blau (2012) find that those with above median wealth or a private pension (DB) plan are less responsive to a focal point at the NRA, suggesting a larger response to the program incentives.
lives past his 70th birthday. 59 This approach estimates whether the individuals in the two groups respond differently to the average incentives for his race-education cell. Since measured incentives are more accurate for those who live to age 70, the second analysis for the first robustness check estimates the model only for individuals with better mortality outcomes.
60 These results should be less prone to bias from measurement error. In Column 1 of Table 3 , a $1,000 increase in household SSW over the next year does not affect those who die before or after age 70 differently as neither the coefficient on the household ACC nor the interaction with living past age 70 are statistically significant. There also is no significant difference by observed mortality in the response to worker benefit incentives (Column 2). Results from Column 3 are consistent with Column 1, so we should conclude that there is likely no response to household incentives for either group. The longer-lived have a slightly stronger response to worker incentives, shown in Column 4, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the longer-lived respond more to incentives. There are no other qualitative differences in the results from the two different approaches. The results from the long-lived sample show a larger response to worker incentives than the full interaction model suggests. Thus, it does not appear measurement error significantly attenuates the coefficient estimates from the base model on worker incentives towards zero.
61 Those who live past age 70 are 10 percentage points more likely to claim at any given age, in contrast to the HRS studies that rely on mortality expectations as a key explanatory variable.
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A primary concern when estimating behavioral responses is the salience of the program being analyzed. The implicit assumption when estimating the response to incentives is individuals fully understand the rules. Chan and Stevens (2008) note it is puzzling how strong the estimated behavioral response to pensions is given most individuals do not have a full understanding of the incentives. They find the response to private pensions is solely driven by those who understand their own pension. Given the complicated rules of the Social Security program, it is reasonable to ask how well individuals understand the program. Leibman and Luttmer (2009) do just this. They find the median voter knows more than we think, but the spouse benefit provision is not well understood. This finding could contribute to the lack of economic meaningful results concerning dependent benefits from the base model. Allowing for individual heterogeneity in knowledge is impossible given the data but instead look at whether those we expect to have more information respond to incentives differently. The best option given the data availability focuses on differences by education. 63 Those with more education 59. Due to the birth cohorts analyzed, age 70 is the latest age I can use and not restrict the sample significantly. I am able to observe all those born 1937 and earlier reach the age 70 threshold, so only those birth cohorts are used for this analysis. 60. For those with high mortality prospects, the average incentives will be overstating their gain to delaying claiming. This group should claim as soon as possible to maximize their lifetime benefits if they do not expect to live until age 80. 61. A similar analysis using the wife's observed mortality is similarly inconclusive, due in part to fewer women observed in the data at age 70 to measure mortality. Results available upon request. 62. Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2004) and Delavande, Perrry, and Willis (2006) . 63. I use the cohort differences created by the Social Security Statement utilized by Mastrobuoni (2011) as a robustness check on the synthetic data. Consistent with his findings, I do not find any meaningful difference in behavior after the dissemination of information. Abowd et al (2006) to combine the four estimates of variance. Notes: Control variables in each model are age dummies, education, interactions of quartics of AIME and potential earnings, own and spouse earnings starting at age 30, experience and its square, years since retirement (if retired), presence of work limiting disability, presence of DB/DC pension, net household wealth up to its cubic, and log(SSW), log(worker benefits), log(spouse benefits), and log(survivor benefits) up to their cubics. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.5, ***p < 0.01.
likely have lower costs to gathering the relevant information, or they have a higher chance of understanding the incentives themselves. Men with a college degree are responsive to their own worker incentives, while those without a degree are not responsive, but again there is no response to spouse or survivor incentives from either group (Table 4 , Column 2). These results suggest that those with less education do not respond to incentives at all. Thus, the concern that only part of the population understands the benefit rules and responds to incentives remains when educational attainment is used as a proxy for information, not at odds with Chan and Abowd et al (2006) to combine the four estimates of variance. Notes: Control variables in each model are age dummies, education, interactions of quartics of AIME and potential earnings, own and spouse earnings starting at age 30, experience and its square, years since retirement (if retired), presence of work limiting disability, presence of DB/DC pension, net household wealth up to its cubic, and log(SSW), log(worker benefits), log(spouse benefits), and log(survivor benefits) up to their cubics. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.5, ***p < 0.01. Stevens (2004) , but also this could be driven by the fact that the calculated incentives may be more measured with error for the less educated. I find those with more education claim later, consistent with previous studies (Mastrobuoni 2011; Sass, Sun, and Webb 2007) . I also estimate the model only for those with a college education. This group might have an effective discount rate in line with our calculations, again providing estimates less susceptible to measurement error. The results in Column 4 show a smaller response to retired worker incentives than the base model. The final model alteration allows complementarities between spouses, allowing the response to incentives to vary between groups expected to have different coordination preferences. For some couples, coordinating labor supply exit may override any response to financial incentives. Looking at the interaction of the retirement and claiming decisions, I allow the husband's claiming choice to vary by the labor force status of his wife (defined below). Over the past 20 years, joint retirement has been increasingly observed among older couples (Hurd 1990; Coile 2004) . Placing a premium on joint leisure could be a potential explanation why men claim benefits early. If one's wife is not working, he may want to retire and claim benefits as soon as possible. Formally evaluating the role of joint leisure is not the goal, but we can see if men are less responsive to financial incentives when we think they are coordinating with their spouse.
I break couples into three groups based on wives' work histories. The first group contains couples where the wife has a weak work history, defined as not being eligible for her own retired worker benefits. This group is not expected to have much differential coordination at retirement or claiming, as the husband has typically had a wife out of the labor market over his life-cycle. Among couples where wives are eligible for their own retired worker benefits, the second group contains husbands with wives still working and the third group where she has left the labor force. 64 This third group is where we might expect to see spousal coordination impacting claiming choices. This is not a formal evaluation of preferences for joint retirement, but it can shed light on whether spousal coordination may impact the claiming decision and the response to incentives. Approximately 15 percent of wives have a strong work history but have exited the labor force, while 30 percent have a strong work histories and are still working. Studies of joint retirement are constrained by the fact that they can only consider couples where both spouses have a strong work history or were both in the labor force at a specific age, typically age 50 or 55. Examining claiming behavior does not face this constraint. The models are estimated for married men only; the omitted category is husbands whose wives have a weak work history. Table 5 presents results allowing for claiming and the response to incentives to vary by the three groups defined above. Starting with the group indicator variables, which are included in all previous models as well (but not shown in tables), husbands whose wives have a stronger work history are less likely to claim than those whose wives have a weak work history. Further, men whose wives have left the labor market and have a strong work history are less responsive to their own benefits. This is consistent with a coordination mechanism since he ignores his own incentives once his wife exits the labor force. There is little response to spouse or survivor incentives. The group where the wife 64. Alternate measures of claiming or retirement do not yield any indication that joint leisure impacts the response claiming decisions to the Social Security incentives. Abowd et al (2006) to combine the four estimates of variance. LF is labor force history. "Wife strong LF" is wives who have at least 10 years of positive earnings and are eligible for their own retired worker benefit from SS. Notes: Control variables in each model are age dummies, education, interactions of quartics of AIME and potential earnings, own and spouse earnings starting at age 30, experience and its square, years since retirement (if retired), presence of disability, presence of DB/DC pension, net household wealth up to its cubic, and log(SSW), log(worker benefits), log(spouse benefits), and log(survivor benefits) up to their cubics. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.5, ***p < 0.01.
has exited but had a strong labor force attachment is more responsive to the spouse benefits. These results point to a desire of the husband to coordinate with his spouse, consistent with other research on joint retirement behavior. Determining more precisely the role of joint leisure is an important avenue for future research, particularly in identifying what combinations of labor force attachment and incentives make couples more susceptible to responding to financial incentives instead of labor supply incentives.
VI. Conclusions
This study highlights the dependence of wives on their husbands for Social Security benefits, a situation that persists long after the onset of the dramatic increase in labor force participation and wages that women have experienced over the past several decades. The findings suggest that husbands' decisions of when to start receiving Social Security benefits are very responsive to their own retired worker benefit incentives, but they are not responsive to the incentives created by dependent benefits. This failure to respond to spousal and survivor incentives can significantly reduce wives' lifetime Social Security benefits.
I estimate models trying to elicit whether responses are driven by certain segments of the population who either respond more to financial incentives or for whom the incentives are calculated more accurately and, therefore, less prone to measurement error. I find those who live longer are slightly more responsive to the incentives from retired worker benefits but are not responsive to other benefit types. Those with the most education are much more likely to claim benefits later and respond to own benefit incentives while those without a college degree do not respond to any benefit incentives. In addition, spousal coordination, perhaps valuing joint leisure, plays a role in determining claiming age for those who experience the retirement of his wife. These men do not respond to their own worker incentives.
Widows' well-being is partially determined by the claiming decision of her deceased spouse. In the case of survivor benefits, claiming age of the husband can increase the benefits by up to 50 percent. There is no evidence of behavior being consistent with husbands prioritizing the survivor benefit. There is a chance that some of the discrepancy between the response to his own incentives compared to those from his wife's benefits could be due to better understanding of own benefits, as noted by , but this may not be the sole explanation, and the current analysis does not allow us to disentangle the possibilities. Future cohorts may be more responsive to all benefits as they will receive the Social Security statement for longer and maybe as a result will learn more about survivor benefits.
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As it currently stands, the Social Security statement does not provide much information about either spouse or survivor benefits, so this is one avenue for information dissemination. In addition, policy circles have talked about trying to disentangle the wives' benefits from their husbands' behavior due to the substantial impact of husband's claiming age on survivor benefits. Given the results of this study, this may be an avenue to consider more seriously. 65 . Social Security statement mailings were suspended due to the budget crisis but have been reimplemented at a reduced rate.
